I’ve stopped dissecting malware for a while (no time– I’ve got a life now), but this one has been running wild for about a week and infecting many of my friends. It seems to run in my social circle (this would make an interesting study; how do bots perpetuate in online social circles?)

C’mon. This is proof I’d do really well working at Symantec, you know? Read more of this post to see how I reverse engineered the bot in under 30 minutes.

To Clean

  1. Boot Windows into safe mode and do not run anything.
  2. Carefully go into “C:\Windows” and remove the “tmpie” folder which contains the payload.
  3. Optionally remove the registry key “HKLM,”Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”,”iexplorer”,0,”%10%\tmpie\iexplorer.exe”"
  4. Reboot into normal mode.
  5. Change AIM password as well as all social networking passwords.
  6. Stop downloading shit like this. Check to make sure the domain is real before you click. Yep, take a second or two to actually look at the URL bar in your browser. Won’t hurt you.

Detective Work

The bot is pretty straight forward with one new feature I’ve never personally seen before; it doesn’t use IRC. You execute the payload, it creates a registry key to start its self up on each boot, hooks a few programs to capture usernames and passwords, and at a set interval IMs all your buddies with the following message:

Did you see this yet? you have to download the flash thing for it to work http://www.liveleak.com.a.llli.**/?video=XqJ8CIaZiEXqJ8CIaZiE

Some victims report variations of the above message that use YouTube and other video sharing websites as lure. All use subdomains of llli.** (The TLD is an abbreviation of a country. WARNING: If you do go have a look for yourself, use caution. Do not execute anything. )

Nice little social engineering there. The page looks very realistic and potential victims of the worm are used to getting that “Update Your Flash Player” notification, so it seems only natural to run the payload. I award a 9/10 for the payload deceptiveness of this one.

vidAIM Worm Screenshot

First off, let’s start with the domain. A quick WHOIS query shows us some information about the owner of it:

Domain Name:                                 LLLI.**
Domain ID:                                   D18235149-US
Sponsoring Registrar:                        ENOM, INC.
Registrar URL (registration services):       whois.enom.com
Domain Status:                               clientTransferProhibited
Registrant ID:                               C5795F921E0
Registrant Name:                             aaron  stevens
Registrant Organization:                     just1
Registrant Address1:                         156 belmont ave
Registrant City:                             belair
Registrant State/Province:                   CA
Registrant Postal Code:                      90210
Registrant Country:                          United States
Registrant Country Code:                     US
Registrant Phone Number:                     +1.8848828383
Registrant Email:                            lstalent1@aim.com
Registrant Application Purpose:              P1
Registrant Nexus Category:                   C11
Administrative Contact ID:                   C5795F921E0
Administrative Contact Name:                 aaron  stevens
Administrative Contact Organization:         just1
Administrative Contact Address1:             156 belmont ave
Administrative Contact City:                 belair
Administrative Contact State/Province:       CA
Administrative Contact Postal Code:          90210
Administrative Contact Country:              United States
Administrative Contact Country Code:         US
Administrative Contact Phone Number:         +1.8848828383
Administrative Contact Email:                lstalent1@aim.com
Administrative Application Purpose:          P1
Administrative Nexus Category:               C11
Billing Contact ID:                          C5795F921E0
Billing Contact Name:                        aaron  stevens
Billing Contact Organization:                just1
Billing Contact Address1:                    156 belmont ave
Billing Contact City:                        belair
Billing Contact State/Province:              CA
Billing Contact Postal Code:                 90210
Billing Contact Country:                     United States
Billing Contact Country Code:                US
Billing Contact Phone Number:                +1.8848828383
Billing Contact Email:                       lstalent1@aim.com
Billing Application Purpose:                 P1
Billing Nexus Category:                      C11
Technical Contact ID:                        C5795F921E0
Technical Contact Name:                      aaron  stevens
Technical Contact Organization:              just1
Technical Contact Address1:                  156 belmont ave
Technical Contact City:                      belair
Technical Contact State/Province:            CA
Technical Contact Postal Code:               90210
Technical Contact Country:                   United States
Technical Contact Country Code:              US
Technical Contact Phone Number:              +1.8848828383
Technical Contact Email:                     lstalent1@aim.com
Technical Application Purpose:               P1
Technical Nexus Category:                    C11
Name Server:                                 NS1.ANEWGIRLSBOX.COM
Name Server:                                 NS2.ANEWGIRLSBOX.COM
Created by Registrar:                        ENOM, INC.
Last Updated by Registrar:                   ENOM, INC.
Domain Registration Date:                    Thu Dec 11 22:13:08 GMT 2008
Domain Expiration Date:                      Thu Dec 10 23:59:59 GMT 2009
Domain Last Updated Date:                    Thu Dec 11 22:14:05 GMT 2008

>>>> Whois database was last updated on: Fri Dec 26 23:22:50 GMT 2008 <<<

Obviously all fake info, which is a violation of eNom’s terms of services. Their account will be terminated. Going to the domain alone urges the visitor to download the payload, so we can confirm that the owner of the domain is the person spreading the bot.

Technical Stuff

Upon “getting the latest Flash Player”, the victim actually downloads an archive with the payload inside. The archive is configured to automatically run it upon execution.

The archive is made up of the following contents:

  • iexplorer1.exe (payload)
  • msado25.tlb
  • MSVBVM60.DLL
  • MSWINSCK.OCX
  • RICHTX32.OCX
  • setup.inf
  • urlmon.dll
  • wbemdisp.tlb
  • wininet.dll

All VB, ActiveX, and DLL.

The payload executable has a file description that reads “Product name: bot”. No surprise there. It was last modified on 10/12/2008 7:28 PM, which is most likely the creation time of the client.

Here we can see a “setup.inf”, which tells the archive how to install the contents. setup.inf includes:

[version]
signature=”$CHICAGO$”

; #### INSTALLER ####
[DefaultInstall]
CopyFiles=install.files
RegisterOCXs=RegDLL.register
AddReg=add-registry-section

[DestinationDirs]
install.files=10,”tmpie”

[install.files]
MSWINSCK.OCX
RICHTX32.OCX
MSVBVM60.DLL
wininet.dll
msado25.tlb
urlmon.dll
wbemdisp.tlb

[RegDLL.register]
“%10%\tmpie\MSWINSCK.OCX”
“%10%\tmpie\RICHTX32.OCX”
“%10%\tmpie\MSVBVM60.DLL”
“%10%\tmpie\msado25.tlb”
“%10%\tmpie\wininet.dll”
“%10%\tmpie\urlmon.dll”
“%10%\tmpie\wbemdisp.tlb”

[add-registry-section]
HKLM,”Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”,”iexplorer”,0,”%10%\tmpie\iexplorer.exe”

This explains its self quite well. The %10% variable equals your system folder. Everything gets stored in the “tmpie” folder and “iexplorer.exe” gets run on every boot. This too is quite deceptive, as iexplorer.exe looks like a legit Windows system file. Props.

The payload includes comments that reference a “Larry”. Perhaps Larry is the writer of this bot? Again, props my main man! We can also decompile his payload, since it’s written in VB.

Symptoms

It’s probably based off of someone else’s work. The bot seems to have been written in VB and uses a commercial DLL file to hook into AIM and Internet Explorer. This, in return, allows the bot to sniff for AIM, Facebook, MySpace, Frienster, and other website credentials, and of course forces the victim to send IMs with a link to the payload. Victims may also experience additional IE pop-ups with revenue-generating ads.

Calling Home

As for control over the botnet, PHP seems to be used and every set interval the bot will call home via an HTTP GET to “http://easyprofiles.****/login.php”. Neat, huh? No more messy IRC nets. Just a website.

Another WHOIS query of easyprofiles.**** gives us:

Domain ID:D19901248-LRMS
Domain Name:EASYPROFILES.INFO
Created On:15-Sep-2007 19:19:24 UTC
Last Updated On:03-Sep-2008 05:07:51 UTC
Expiration Date:15-Sep-2009 19:19:24 UTC
Sponsoring Registrar:eNom, Inc. (R126-LRMS)
Status:OK
Registrant ID:8FFBFEAEF102D2EE
Registrant Name:aaron stevens
Registrant Organization:just1
Registrant Street1:156 belmont ave
Registrant Street2:
Registrant Street3:
Registrant City:belair
Registrant State/Province:ca
Registrant Postal Code:90210
Registrant Country:US
Registrant Phone:+1.8848828383
Registrant Phone Ext.:
Registrant FAX:
Registrant FAX Ext.:
Registrant Email:lstalent1@aim.com
Admin ID:8FFBFEAEF102D2EE
Admin Name:aaron stevens
Admin Organization:just1
Admin Street1:156 belmont ave
Admin Street2:
Admin Street3:
Admin City:belair
Admin State/Province:ca
Admin Postal Code:90210
Admin Country:US
Admin Phone:+1.8848828383
Admin Phone Ext.:
Admin FAX:
Admin FAX Ext.:
Admin Email:lstalent1@aim.com
Billing ID:8FFBFEAEF102D2EE
Billing Name:aaron stevens
Billing Organization:just1
Billing Street1:156 belmont ave
Billing Street2:
Billing Street3:
Billing City:belair
Billing State/Province:ca
Billing Postal Code:90210
Billing Country:US
Billing Phone:+1.8848828383
Billing Phone Ext.:
Billing FAX:
Billing FAX Ext.:
Billing Email:lstalent1@aim.com
Tech ID:8FFBFEAEF102D2EE
Tech Name:aaron stevens
Tech Organization:just1
Tech Street1:156 belmont ave
Tech Street2:
Tech Street3:
Tech City:belair
Tech State/Province:ca
Tech Postal Code:90210
Tech Country:US
Tech Phone:+1.8848828383
Tech Phone Ext.:
Tech FAX:
Tech FAX Ext.:
Tech Email:lstalent1@aim.com
Name Server:NS1.ANEWGIRLSBOX.COM
Name Server:NS2.ANEWGIRLSBOX.COM
Name Server:
Name Server:
Name Server:
Name Server:
Name Server:
Name Server:
Name Server:
Name Server:
Name Server:
Name Server:
Name Server:

Looks familiar, no?